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There  can  be  little  doubting  the  central  role  which  has  been  played  in macroeconomic  theory  and 
policy  by first the natural  rate  of unemployment  (hereafter  NRU)  and  more  latterly  the  NAIRU  (non 
accelerating  inflation  rate  of  unemployment).2  Its  influence  on  policy  has  arisen  from  its  apparent 
message  that  demand  reflation  can  have,  at best,  short  lived  beneficial  effects  on  employment  with 
longer  term  inflationary  consequences,  and  that  supply  side  measures  may  have  some  effect  on  the 
unemployment  whereas  demand  side  measures  do  not  any  long  term  effects.  The  fear  of  inflation, 
especially  of rising inflation  moving  into  hyperinflation,  has  then  led  to  a reluctance  (to  put  it mildly) 
to  allow  the  level  of unemployment  to  fall below  the  NAIRU. 
This  paper  is concerned  with  the  question  of the  relevance  of  the  NAIRU  for  policy  formulation. 
However  that  question  leads to the following  consideration.  The  estimates  for  the  NAIRU  are based 
on the econometric  estimation  of models  of the  economy.  Particular  models  are  used  and  particular 
interpretations  are placed  on  the  relationship  between  the  variables  which  the  mode1  involves.  Since 
the NAIRU  can  never  be  directly  observed,  resort  has to  be  made  to  the  econometric  estimation  of 
wage  and price  equations  from  which  an equilibrium  solution  for unemployment  is derived  and  labeled 
the NAIRU.  It is  therefore  important  to know  how  valid  those  models  are and  the  estimates  derived 
Tom  those  models.  Whilst  some  have  pointed  to  the  unreliability  of those  estimates  (e.g.  Setterfieid 
et alia, 1992) and others  to the  degree  of uncertainty  surrounding  the  estimates  (e.g.  Madsen,  1997), 
others  have  put  a great  deal  of  faith  in  specific  estimates:  for  example  the  ‘Tightness  in the  labor 
market  is  measured  by  the  excess  of  CBO’s  estimate  of  the  non  accelerating  inflation  rate  of 
unemployment  (NAIRU)  over  the  actual  unemployment  rate.  It  is  an  indicator  of  f%ture  wage 
inflation’  (Congressional  Budget  Office,  1994,  p.4),  and  that  Office  uses  an estimate  of 6 percent  for 
the  NAIRU.  One  expression  of the  belief  in the  NAIRU  is given  by  Stiglitz  when  he writes  that  ‘I have  become  convinced  that  the  NAIRU  is  a useful  analytic  concept.  It  is use&l  as  a theory  to 
understand  the  causes  of  inflation.  It  is useful  as an  empirical  basis  for  predicting  changes  in the 
inflation  rate.  And  it  is  useful  as  a general  guideline  for  thinking  about  macroeconomic  policy’ 
(Stiglitz,  1997,  p.3). 
The  focus  of this  paper  is not  on the  reliability  or  otherwise  of estimates  of the  NAIRU,  but  rather 
to  evaluate  the  theoretical  foundation  of the  models  from  which  the  NAIRU  has been  derived.  For 
if  those  models  are  on  some  relevant  criteria  judged  to  be  unsound,  then  estimates  and  policy 
conclusions  derived  are  seemly  unsound. 
In  the  next  section,  we  discuss  what  is  meant  by  the  notion  of  the  NAIRU,  and  what  could  be 
considered  the  essential  characteristics  of  the  NAIRU.  This  is followed  by  a section  in which  we 
reflect  on the relationship  between  economic  models  and reality. Section  4 provides  a detailed  critique 
of two  approaches  to the NAIRU  which  have been  particularly  influential,  one  more  so in the  United 
State  (that  of Gordon)  and the  other  more  in Europe  (Layard,  Nickel1 and  Jackman).  Following  from 
that  we  argue  that  the  mechanisms  by  which  an  economy  would  reach  any  NAIRU  have  been 
inadequately  specified  and can be  subject  to  much  criticism.  The  next  section  argues  that  the  models 
underlying  the  derivation  of a NAIRU  have  not  only  ignored  the  role  of aggregate  demand  but  have 
also (implicitly)  invoked  Say’s Law  that  ‘supply  creates  its own  demand’.  Section  7 provides  a more 
formal  treatment  of  the  role  of  aggregate  demand.  In  the  next  section,  consideration  is given  to 
alternative  views  on  how  real  wages  are  settled.  In the  last  substantive  section,  we  reflect  on  the 
reasons  why  it has often  been  observed  that  the  estimates  of the  NAIRU  track  actual  unemployment 
(albeit  with  some  lag). 
2 Defining  the  NAIRU 
At one  level, the  definition  of a NAIRU  is (almost)  self-evident  namely  that,  within  the  context  of a 
particular  model,  the  NAIRU  is  the  equilibrium  solution  (for  unemployment)  arising  from  the 
imposition  of  the  condition  that  the  rate  of  inflation  is constant3  (and  the  conditions  usually  also 
include  that  expectations  are  fulfilled).  There  are,  though,  a range  of  models  from  which  such  an 
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models  (and  hence  all derived  NAIRUs)  would  be usually  included  under  the  NAIRU  ‘umbrella’. 
There  are common  themes  which  enables  us to  say that  the  concept  of the  NAIRU  conforms  to  the 
following: 
(I) the NAIRU  is an equilibrium  rate  of unemployment4  based  on  supply  side  consideration  only.  In 
so far as aggregate  demand  is given  any role within  the  model  it does  not  affect  the  NAIRU,  and  this 
means  that  there  is  an  essential  separation  of  the  supply-side  and  the  demand-side  (akin  to  the 
classical  dichotomy)  and  the  operation  of  some  form  of  Says  Law  (further  discussed  below).  ‘Thus 
the  natural  rate hypothesis  applies the  classical  proposition  of monetary  neutrality  to  unemployment, 
and in doing  so yields the  policy  ineffectiveness  proposition  that  aggregate  demand  policy  measures 
cannot  change  the  sustainable  or equilibrium  rate  of unemployment’  (Cross,  1995,  p.  18 1 : note  that 
Cross  uses the term  ‘natural rate’  more  broadly  than  this  paper  does  and  as a synonym  for  NAIRU). 
(ii) the NAIRU  is not  path  dependent.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  short  term  NAIRU  is the  same  as 
the long  term  one  for there  can be effects  of changes  in unemployment  on the  pace  of  (wage)  inflation 
(cf. Cross,  1995) but  it does  require  that there  is some  effect  of the  level  of unemployment  on  (wage) 
inflation  and  that  there  are  no  persistent  effects  arising  from,  for  example,  the  level  of  aggregate 
demand  and  its effects  on  investment,  capacity  and  labor  force  participation.  The  term  hysteresis  is 
oflen  to used  to refer to  cases where  there  is some  prolonged  effect  from,  say,  current  unemployment 
but where  the  effect gradually  wears  off, and  hence  where  there  are no  persistent  effects.  Apart  from 
matters  of accuracy  in the use of words  (noting  that  hysteresis  in its application  in the  area  of physics 
does  involve  persistent  effects),  it is important  to  note  that  the  concept  of  the  NAIRU  precludes 
persistent  effects  arising  from  the  path  of aggregate  demand.. 
(iii) the NAIRU  is unique.  This is not  an intrinsic  feature  of the  NAIRU  and  indeed  there  are models 
in  which  multiple  equilibria  are  found  (e.g.  Manning,  1992).  But  the  estimation  of  the  underlying 
equations  and  the  general  discussion  on  the  NAIRU  proceed  in a manner  consistent  with  a unique 
equilibrium. 
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as a ‘strong  attractor’  for  the  actual  rate  of unemployment  (Phelps,  1995).  The  mechanism  through 
which  the  NAIRU  could  be  a  strong  attractor  (and  more  generally  the  stability  and  adjustment 
properties  of NAIRU  models)  is discussed  below.  However,  others  have  adopted  a rather  different 
perspective  ; for example,  Blanchard  (1995)  remarks  that  ‘the  natural  rate  is at best  a weak  attractor’ 
and  that  ‘the  natural  rate  is often  as much  an attractee  as it is an attractor’  (pxiii).  But  if that  were 
the  case,  the  NAIRU  loses  most  of  its  power  as  a concept  even  if it in  some  sense  described  an 
equilibrium  outcome.  Clearly  if the  NAIRU  were  a weak  attractor  (because,  for  example,  the  level 
of aggregate  demand  determined  a quite  different  level  of employment)  and/or  if it were  an attractee 
(because,  for  example,  the  path  of  the  economy  influences  investment  which  creates  the  level  of 
capacity  which  in turn  effectively  determines  the NAIRU)5,  then  its operational  power  would  be very 
small. 
In a similar vein  as de Vroey  (1996)  argues,  Keynes  could  have  readily  agreed  with  Friedman  on  the 
definition  of the  ‘natural  rate  of unemployment’  (as in the  quote  given  below)  as corresponding  to 
full employment  (taking  into  account  frictional  and  search  unemployment)  but  differed  in the  major 
respect  as to  whether  there  was  a strong  feedback  mechanism  leading  actual  unemployment  to  the 
natural  rate.  Keynes  would  view  the  forces  leading  the  actual  rate  of  unemployment  towards  the 
‘natural  rate’  as  weak,  and  the  achievement  of  the  ‘natural  rate’  would  require  a  high  level  of 
aggregate  demand.  In contrast,  Friedman  would  view  the  adjustment  of real  wages  in the  face  of the 
excess  supply  of labor  as the  mechanism  by which  the  unemployment  moved  rapidly  to  the  ‘natural 
rate’. 
There  is,  though,  a  strong  suggestion  in  the  usual  presentation  of  the  NAIRU that  actual 
unemployment  is strongly  influenced  by the  NAIRU  (though  this  may  come  about  through  policy 
responses  to  divergences  of unemployment  from  the  perceived  NAIRU).  There  is little  hint  in the 
discussion  on the NAIRU  of what  would  prevent  actual  unemployment  veering  towards  the  NAIRU. 
Specifically,  and  as further  discussed  below,  this  entails  the  assumption  that  aggregate  demand  will 
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constraints  on  an  economy  reaching  the  NAIRU,  and  the  one  which  comes  readily  to  mind  here 
would  be  a balance  of trade  constraint. 
The  second  aspect  is that  the  NAIRU  can be viewed  as an equilibrium  level  of unemployment  with 
‘knife edge’  properties  in that  any  significant  and  prolonged  deviation  of actual  unemployment  from 
the  NAIRU  will  involve  continuously  rising  or falling  inflation.  Since  the  NAIRU  is presented  as a 
unique  point  (rather  than,  say,  a plateau),  this  knife  edge  property  appears  to  rule  out  even  the 
smallest  of  deviations  from  the  NAIRU.  However,  the  rate  of  acceleration  may  not  be that  rapid  : 
take,  for example  the  coefficients  estimated  by Layard,  Nickel1 and  Jackman  (1991)  (hereaRer  LNJ) 
for  the  United  States.  Their  figures  suggest  that  for  each  1 per  cent  unemployment  is below  the 
NAIRU,  price inflation  will rise by  1.4 per  cent.6 Hence  at the  end  of five years  with  unemployment 
1 per cent point  below  u*,  inflation  would  be just  over  7 per  cent  higher:  according  to  the  model,  it 
would,  of  course,  continue  to  rise.  Gordon  (1997)  suggests  that  the  rate  of  acceleration  would  be 
rather  small, and postulates  that  unemployment  1 per  cent  lower  than  the  NAIRU  for  starting  at the 
end  of  1997  through  to  2005  would  lead  to  inflation  being  5.3 per  cent  higher  in that  year.  These 
order  of magnitudes  leads  Stiglitz  to  state  that  ‘Contrary  to  the  accelerationist  view,  not  only  does 
the  economy  not  stand  on a precipice--  with  a slight dose  of inflation  leading  to  ever-increasing  levels 
of inflation--but  the  magnitude  by which  inflation rises does  not  increase  when  the  unemployment  rate 
is held  down  for  a prolonged  period  of time’  (Stiglitz,  1997,  p.9).  He  estimates  that  inflation  rises 
by 0.3  to  0.6  per  cent  for  each  1 per  cent  unemployment  is below  the  NAIRU. 
The third  aspect  is that the NRU  is identified  with  a competitive  equilibrium  following  the  well  known 
definition  of Friedman  for  the  NRU  as ‘the  level  that  would  be ground  out  by the  Wairasian  system 
of  general  equilibrium  equations,  provided  there  is  embedded  in  them  the  actual  structural 
characteristics  of  the  labor  and  commodity  markers,  including  market  imperfections,  stochastic 
variability in demands  and  supplies,  the  cost  of gathering  information  about  job  vacancies  and  labor 
availabilities, the  costs  of mobility,  and  so on.’  (Friedman,  1968,  p.8).  As Pesaran  and  Smith  (1995) 
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rate, but is determined  by a host  of market  and  non-market  factors..  .  Friedman’s  primary  reason  for 
introducing  this concept  was  an attempt  to  ‘separate  the  real  forces  from  the  monetary  forces’  that 
impinge  on  the  market  rate  of unemployment.’  (p.  203). 
The view  can be taken  that the  NAIRU  is the  general  concept  of which  the  NRU  is a particular  case 
when  there  is perfect,  rather  than  imperfect,  competition.  This  is then  suggestive  of the  notion  that 
unemployment  above  the  ‘natural rate’  can be ascribed to imperfect  competition  : the  ‘imperfectionist 
approach’  (Eatwell  and Milgate,  1983). There  are  a variety  of ways,  though,  in which  the  NRU  (and 
the  associated  framework)  differs  from  the  imperfectionist  NAIRU,  and  two  are  highlighted  here. 
First,  the  role  of  unemployment  is essentially  different.  In  the  NRU,  unemployment  is  essentially 
search  unemployment,  and  there  is more  or less unemployment  than  the  ‘natural  rate’  according  to 
whether  people  (on  average)  spend  more  or  less  time  on  searching  for  improved  wage  offers.  The 
appropriate  measure  of unemployment  is then  one  which  matches  up  with  search  unemployment.  In 
the NAIRU,  unemployment  in equilibrium  at the  NAIRU  is whatever  is required  to  hold  inflation  in 
check,  and  does  not  carry  any  connotation  of involving  full  employment  or  of  arising  from  search. 
Unemployment  is essentially  a proxy  for  the  factors  which  bear  down  on  wage  claims  and  measures 
of  unemployment  have  to  be  considered  in  that  light.  The  relationship  between  the  level  of 
unemployment  and  the  factors  bearing  down  on  wage  claims  may  change  over  time  and  this  is 
reflected  in a recent  statement  by  Alan  Greenspan,  when  he  stated  that  ‘heightened  job  insecurity 
explains  a significant  part  of the restraint  on  compensation  and  the  consequent  muted  price  inflation’ 
(Greenspan,  1997) and cites a survey  which  found  that while in the recession  year  of  199 1 25  per  cent 
ofworkers  feared  being  laid  off this  rose  to  46 per  cent  in the  relatively  low  unemployment  year  of 
1996. 
The  NRU  can  be  seen  as  an  essentially  micro  phenomenon,  in  being  based  on  individual  search 
behavior,  and  derived  from  summation  over  individuals.  In  contrast,  the  NAIRU  is an  essentially 
macro  phenomenon  in that  it is not  based  on  the  choices  of  individuals  (except  in the  sense  that 
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chosen).  If  the  NAIRU  does  exist,  it  does  so  at  the  macro  or  systemic  level,  and  there  is  no 
counterpart  for  the  NAIRU  at the  micro-economic  or individual  level.  It is not  possible  to  observe 
mini-NAIRUs  for each  individual  and  to  obtain  the  NAIRU  through  summation.  It is ironic  that  the 
concept  of the NAIRU  should  have  become  so central  to  mainstream  economics  which  is otherwise 
based  on  methodological  individualism. 
3. On  models  and  reality 
Most,  perhaps  all, concepts  in economics  (and  more  generally  in the  social  sciences)  are  not  directly 
observable  or  measurable.  However,  for  many  concepts,  there  is  a  correspondence  between  the 
theoretical  concept  and  statistical  measures  which  bear  the  same  or  similar  name  : in the  realm  of 
macroeconomics  concepts  such as money,  income,  unemployment  fall into  this  category.  Even  then, 
however,  there  are  differences  as  to  how  the  concept  is  characterized  by  different  authors  or 
paradigms,  and questions  as to the  degree  to which  the  statistical  measure  conforms  to  the  theoretical 
construct  bearing  the  same  name.  There  are also  a range  of concepts  (including  utility,  value)  which 
are  not  expected  to  be  directly  observable’  but  which  are  thought  to  be  useful  in  undertaking 
economic  analysis  (leaving  aside  the  question  of how  usefulness  is to  be  defined). 
This  situation  is  not  unique  to  the  social  sciences,  and  there  are  many  examples  in  the  physical 
sciences  of  the  use  of  concepts  which  were  postulated  to  exist  but  which  could  not  be  directly 
observed.  The  example  which  comes  to  mind  is the  notion  of the  existence  of the  planet  Pluto  which 
was postulated  to  exist  because  of the  movement  of other  planets  before  Pluto  itself  was  observed. 
(Even  here the  question  could  be posed  as to  whether  the  observed  Pluto  conformed  to  the  concept 
Pluto  : e.g.  the  concept  may  have  been  given  a particular  mass  and  volume  which  may  not  have 
corresponded  precisely  with  the  observed  Pluto  (and  even  then  there  are  clearly  measurement 
problems).  But  for  many  of  the  example  derived  from  the  natural  sciences  it has  been  eventually 
possible  to  observe  the  postulated  concept  and  confirm  its actual  existence. 
It is argued  here that  the  concept  of the  NAIRU  falls into  the  category  of concepts  which  are  drawn 
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observed.  The  underlying  concept  may or may not  actually  exist,  and  to  some  degree  the  users  of the 
concept  may not  be too  concerned  as to  whether  the  concept  does  actually  exist,  though  they  would 
be  concerned  that  the  events  in  the  real  world  conformed  to  the  predictions  derived  from  that 
concept.  The NAIRU  can  never  be observed  directly,  though  it may  be possible  to  observe  whether 
events  in the  real  world  (in this  case  the  rate  of inflation)  do  or  do  not  conform  to  the  predictions 
based  on  the  NAIRU.  Even  if there  is  observational  conformity  between  the  real  world  and  the 
NAIRU  concept  (which  is little  more  than  inflation  rises  when  unemployment  is below  a particular 
level and falls when  unemployment  is above  that level), this would  not  permit  us to  conclude  anything 
about  the  nature  of  the  NAIRU  (and  this  leaves  aside  the  well  known  difficulties  in  establishing 
whether  or not there  is conformity  of the  real world  with  the  NAIRU).  In  particular,  it could  not  be 
concluded  that the  level of unemployment  for which  inflation  is constant  is a NAIRU  (which  we  take 
here  to  be  supply-side  determined). 
The  situation  in the  case of the NAIRU  is further  complicated  by the  following  considerations.  First, 
whilst there  may be general  agreement  on the  broad  nature  of the  NAIRU  (which  we  have  sought  to 
summarize  in  the  previous  section),  there  are  a variety  of  different  NAIRUs.  It  has  already  been 
remarked  that  the  natural  rate  of  unemployment  (NRU)  could  be  treated  as  a  sub-species  of  the 
NAIRU  (in the  sense that both  correspond  to non-accelerating  inflation  and  constant  labor  share)  but 
that the NRU  is based  on  competitive  markets  whereas  as the  NAIRU  is generally  not.  The  NRU  is 
generally  calculated  as an  equilibrium  solution  of the  expectations-augmented  Phillips’  curve.  We 
have,  though,  argued  elsewhere  (Sawyer,  1987)  that  the  Phillips’  curve  itself  has  at  least  four 
interpretations,  and  hence  any  NRU  calculated  from  a  Phillips’  curve  has  similarly  different 
interpretations  which  can  be  attached.*  More  generally,  any precise  definition  of a NAIRU  depends 
on  a particular  economic  model  (or  perhaps  more  accurately  sub-model)  along  with  the  notion  of 
equilibrium  which  is imposed  (usually  that  expectations  are fulfilled  and that  real wage  grows  in line 
with  labor  productivity). 
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according  to the precise  model  specification  which  has been  used,  but  estimates  have  (especially  for 
most  European  countries)  proved  to  vary  over  time.  Indeed  a number  of authors  who  are favorable 
disposed  to  the  NAIRU  (e.g.  Gordon,  1997,  Giorno,  Richardson,  Roseveare,  and  van  den  Noord, 
1995)  have  produced  time  varying  estimates  of  the  NAIRU.  Whilst  it is clearly  possible  that  the 
parameters  ofthe  model  Corn  which  the  NAIRU  has been  derived  change  over  time,  and  hence  that 
the  NAIRU  changes,  this  would  be  a  matter  of  faith  (or  assumption)  which  would  need  to  be 
reinforced  by good  reasons  as to  why  the  underlying  parameters  had  changed. 
The  fact  that  a concept  cannot  in its nature  ever  be  observed  does  not  mean  that  such  a concept  is 
wrong  or  useless.  Whilst  I would  doubt  the  benefits  which  have  come  from  the  application  of the 
concept  of the NAIRU,  I cannot  doubt  that  it has been  useful  to  policy  makers  (in the  sense  that  they 
appear  to  have  responded  to  the  concept,  though  whether  it has  been  useful  for  the  health  of  the 
economy  is a quite  separate  issue).  It does  mean  though  that  care must  be exercised  in the  use  of that 
concept,  and consider  the  assumptions  and argument  which  lie behind  the  generation  of that  concept. 
In  this  regard,  the  NAIRU  generally  builds  in two  sets  of  assumptions,  namely  that  the  underlying 
equilibrium  is  supply  side  determined  and  that  the  appropriate  equilibrium  conditions  include 
expectations  being  fulfilled  and  wages  rising  in  line  with  prices  after  adjustment  for  productivity 
changes. 
4. A critique  of the  models  :  price  and  wage  equations 
DEerent  authors  have  proposed  different  models  of the  NAIRU.  This  itself  is significant  in that  the 
models  are  oflen  substantially  different  (rather  than  differing  say in whether  the  economy  is treated 
as open  or closed,  how  far the government  is included).  Thus  what  can be  said  of one  model  may not 
be true  of another.  In this section  we focus  on two  models  which  have  been  influential  and  which  are 
broadly  representative  of  other  models.  We  first  focus  on  the  model  of  LNJ  (1991)  (which  is  a 
development  of Layard  and Nickell,  1985,  1986)  as that  has been  probably  the  most  fully  articulated 
(and is similar to the  one which  underlies  the model  of the Federal  Reserve.9  In this  discussion  we  will 
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does  not  basically  alter  the  points  we  wish  to  make.  The  second  one  examined  is the  one  which 
underlies  the  work  of Robert  Gordon  (e.g.  Gordon,  1982). 
(I)  model  of Layard,  Nickel1 and  Jackman 
In the LNJ  (1991)  model  (as reflected  in the  equations  which  they  estimate  and  in their  discussion  in 
Chapter  7lo), the NAIRU  is derived  from  the  interaction  of price  and  wage  determination.  The  price 
equation  is generally  based  on  profit  maximization  under  conditions  of imperfect  competition,  and 
yields  the  well  known  relationship  that  price  is equal  to  a mark-up  over  marginal  costs  where  the 
mark-up  depends  on  the  elasticity  of demand  facing  the  firm.  This  can be re-written  as real wage  is 
equal to marginal  revenue  product  of labor. This is often,  though  erroneously,  described  as a demand 
for  labor  curve  (cf.  Hahn,  1995,  p.46:  Sawyer,  1992).”  It  is not  a demand  for  labor  curve  in two 
ways.  First, the real  (product)  wage  is not  parametric  for  the  enterprise  but  rather,  since  the  price  is 
set  by  the  enterprise,  it  is  endogenous  at  the  enterprise  level.  Second,  the  profit  maximization 
calculations  would  generate  a point  outcome  (that  is a unique  level  of  output,  employment,  real 
product  wage  etc.).  Different  levels  of  real  product  wage,  employment  would  only  result  if some 
variables  exogenous  to  the  enterprise  change,  and  two  notable  ones  here  would  be  the  level  of 
aggregate  demand  and  the  competitors’  prices  (cf.  Sawyer,  1992). 
The  equation  based  on the  decisions  of the  firm  on  output  and  price  which  relates  wage,  relative  to 
price,  with  employment  offered  (and  which  is  often  referred  to  as  the  demand  for  labor  curve, 
erroneously  as pointed  out  above)  is generally  drawn  as having  a negative  slope,  even  though  ‘Under 
imperfect  competition  there  is  no  compelling  reason  to  suppose  that  the  ‘demand’  for  labor  is 
negatively  sloped  nor is there  any reason  to  suppose  that it has only  one  intersection  with  the  ‘supply’ 
curve.  Increasing  returns  are  quite  sufficient  to  give  us what  we  want  here.  . . .Of course  if there  are 
multiple  equilibria  then  even  if we  can  be  sure  of  convergent  dynamic  processes,  initial  conditions 
(‘history’)  will  play  an important  role  in which  equilibrium  is eventually  established.’  (Hahn,  1995, 
p.47). 
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to  wage  depends  on  expected  demand  for  output  relative  to  the  level  of  output  based  on  full 
utilization  of  resources,  and  on  planned  output  relative  to  the  capital  stock  (reflecting  effect  of 
demand  on  mark-up  and  of output  on  marginal  costs  respectively).  At  a later  stage,  unemployment 
is taken  as (negatively)  related  with  expected  demand  for  output  relative  to  output  based  on  full 
utilization  of  resources,  and  thereby  price  (relative  to  expected  wages)  becomes  dependent  on 
unemployment. 
The wage  equation  is based  on two  elements  (LNJ,  199 1, p~.364-6).‘~  The  first  is an insider/outsider 
argument  whereby  the  enterprise  decides  upon  the  money  wage  which  is  consistent  with  the 
continued  employment  of those  workers  deemed  to  be insiders.  The  second  is a wage  for  ‘outsiders’ 
which  is  based  upon  unemployment  (level  and  changes),  ‘other  factors  such  as  generosity  and 
coverage  of unemployment  benefits’  (p.365)  and the  expected  average  wage.  The  average  wage  paid 
by  the  enterprise  is then  an appropriately  weighted  average  of these  two  elements.  The  significant 
element  here  is that  the  equation  for the insider wage  element  essentially  repeats  the  price  equation.  l3 
Apart  from  representing  what  is essentially  one  decision  as though  it were  two,  this  approach  also 
has  the  technical  result  that  factors  such  as output  relative  to  capital  stock  appear  in the  same  way 
in both  the price  and wage  equation,  and  when  those  two  are  solved  out  (for  the  equilibrium  level  of 
unemployment)  those  factors  ‘disappear’.  The  significance  of this  is that  factors  such  as the  capital 
stock  depend  on  the  level  of  aggregate  demand  through  investment,  and  hence  potential  effects  of 
aggregate  demand  are  eliminated  (as will be illustrated  in the  model  developed  below).14 
From  these  pricing  considerations,  an equation  can be derived  which  relates  the  price  relative  to  wage 
(the inverse  of the real product  wage)  to  the  level  of (un)employment  (and  a range  of  other  of other 
factors).  This  is sketched  for  the  real  wage  as a function  of employment  in Figure  1 as the p-curve. 
The  positively  sloped  section  is possible  under  imperfect  competition,  and  gives  rise to  the  possibility 
of multiple  equilibria  and  complicates  consideration  of  stability. 
Figure  1 near  here 
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(un)employment,  though  the  interpretation 
unemployment  would  be rather  different. 
lead  to  a  relationship  between  the  real  wage  and 
to  be  placed  on  the  resulting  equilibrium  level  of 
The  first  possibility  is the  use  of  the  aggregate  supply  of  labor  curve.  It  is widely  recognized  that 
placing  a supply  of labor  curve  alongside  the  price  curve  (which  as we  have  argued  is not  a demand 
for labor curve  but  is a locus  of offers  of real wage  and  employment)  the  resulting  equilibrium  level 
of  unemployment  is  one  of  full  employment  (almost  tautologically  since  the  equilibrium  level  of 
unemployment  lies on the  supply  of labor  curve).  It is also  recognized  that  such  an equilibrium  will 
involve  less employment  than  an otherwise  comparable  position  of perfect  competition,  and  that  there 
may be multiple  equilibria which  may  be ranked.  l5 However,  whilst  this  approach  has  featured  in the 
literature  on  imperfect  competition,  it  has  not,  as  far  as  we  are  aware,  featured  in  the  NAIRU 
literature. 
The  second  possibility  is a wage  equation  which  is derived  from  the  aspirations  of workers  and  in that 
way  is  independent  of  enterprises  pricing  considerations.  An  example  of this  comes  from  Sawyer 
(1982)  (and  that  was  based  on  the  wage  equation  estimated  in Henry,  Sawyer  and  Smith,  1976) 
where  the  wage  change  equation  is of the  general  form: 
Dw=a,+a,Dp+a,U+a,(w-p-l)  (1) 
where  D  is  the  difference  operator,  w  log  of  money  wage,  p  log  of  price  level,  U  the  rate  of 
unemployment,  and  T a target  real wage.  With  the  condition  of a,  =  1, the  equilibrium  condition  of 
Bv  = Dp  (assuming  for  convenience  that  labor  productivity  growth  is zero)  gives: 
w-p= 
which  is  a negative  relationship  between  real  wage  and  unemployment  and  hence  a positive  one 
between  real wage  and  employment.  The  relationship  here  between  the  real  wage  and  employment 
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equilibrium level of unemployment  which  corresponds  to  a NAIRU. 
(ii)  model  of Gordon 
The approach of Gordon (1981,  1997)  is rather different, and is concerned  to  derive  a reduced  form 
equation  linking  price inflation  with unemployment.  He argues  that  ‘the  earlier  fixation  on  wages  was 
a mistake.  The  relation  of  prices  to  wages  has  changed  over  time.  .  . The  Fed’s  goal  is to  control 
inflation,  not  wage  growth,  and  models  with  separate  wage  growth  and  price  markup  equations  do 
not  perform  as  well  as  the  equation  above  [reported  as  eq..  7 below],  in  which  wages  are  only 
implicit.’  (Gordon,  1997,  p. 17). Apart  from  an unease  arising  from  the  idea  that  reliance  should  be 
placed  on a reduced  form  which  in some  sense works  better  than  the  underlying  structural  equations, 
it  also  means  overlooking  the  implicit  assumptions  which  are  being  made  to  arrive  at the  reduced 
form.  We now  seek to unravel  those  implicit  assumptions  by postulating  some  underlying  equations. 
We  begin  with  a Phillips’  curve  of the  form: 
Dw=a+bDp”+cII  (3) 
Dp” is based  on  past  price  inflation  (4) 
The  price  change  equation  is based  on  changes  in unit  labor  costs  and  in material  costs,  modified  by 
capacity  utilization  (assumed  to influence  the  mark-up),  i.e. : 
Dp=e+JTDw-Dq)+hDc+gCU  (5) 
where DC is change in log of imported  material  costs c, Dq change in log of labor productivity  q  and: 
other  productivity  assumed  constant  or absorbed  into labor productivity.  These  equations  would  solve 
out  to  give: 
Dp = a + b lagged  price  inflation  -fDq  + h DC + CU + g CIJ 
which  simplifies  to: 
(6) 
Dp = a*  + b* lagged  price  inflation  + c*  U-fDq  (7) 
with g = 0 or a time invariant relationship between unemployment  and capacity utilization  plus some 
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maintained  hypothesis  that  b*=l  Set  out  in this  manner,  it is an easy  matter  to  indicate  what  are  (at 
least some  of)  the  implicit  assumptions  which  are being  made  in the  estimation  of (7).  These  would 
include: 
(a)  stability  of the  unemployment-capacity  utilization  relationship  ; 
(b)  the  absence  of effects  of changes  in unemployment  and  in capacity  utilization  on  wage  and  price 
inflation  respectively  ; 
0  the  absence  of error  correction  mechanisms  in both  equations. 
(d) (although  not  self evident  from  the  above  equations)  the  assumption  that  the  price  index  relevant 
for  wage  settlements  is the  same  price  index  relevant  for  price  determination  equations. 
We would  argue  that there  is reason  to  cast  doubt  on  each  of these  assumptions  and  note  that  many 
wage  equations  have  found  a  role  for  changes  in  unemployment  and  for  error  correction 
mechanisms.  l6 
It is possible  to  argue,  as Gordon  (1997)  does  and  as illustrated  in the  quote  given  above,  that  what 
matters  is  the  reduced  form  relationship  between  inflation  and  unemployment  since  it is inflation 
which  the Federal  Reserve  (and  others)  targets,  and  unemployment  is used  as the  indicator  of future 
inflation  from  which  the  Fed  and  others  can  make  decisions  on  interest  rates  (assumed  to  influence 
aggregate  demand  and  thereby  the  rate  of  inflation).  However,  that  argument  requires  that  the 
‘equilibrium  ‘  rate  of  unemployment  which  is  calculated  from  the  equivalent  of  eqn.  (7)  above 
provides  an accurate  estimate  of the  NAIRU.  In order  to  arrive  at eqn.  (7)  it is clearly  necessary  to 
make  a range  of  subsidiary  assumptions. 
The  purpose  of this  section  has been  to  expose  some  of the  weaknesses  of two  main  approaches  to 
the  estimation  of the  NAIRU.  We  have  done  this  in light  of the  arguments  in the  preceding  section 
on  the  nature  of the  NAIRU  concept.  Briefly  expressed,  this  is that  since  the  NAIRU  can  never  be 
directly  observed,  the  estimation  of the NAIRU  (and associated  belief  in its existence)  is only  as good 
as the underlying  model  Corn which  the NAIRU  is derived.  If those  models  leave  out  some  significant 
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Frank  Hahn  when  he  writes  that  ‘Theories  of the  natural  rate  are  amongst  the  class  of  shaky  and 
vastly  incomplete  theories.’  (Hahn,  1995,  p.54).  . 
5.  Equilibrium,  stability  and  adjustment  mechanisms 
It k USUal  for an investigator  to  produce  a single  estimate  of the  NAIRU  (and  it should  be  noted  that 
such an estimate  is usually  produced  as a point  estimate  without  any  accompanying  estimates  of the 
standard  errors  or confidence  intervals  of such  an estimate).  In doing  so, two  assumptions  are being 
made.  First, the levels of the  exogenous  variables  are being  set at some  (often  unspecified)  level  : for 
example  in the model  derived  from  Gordon  (1982)  some  assumption  has to  be made  about  the  rate 
of  productivity  growth.  Second,  and  of more  significance  here,  is that  the  assumption  is made  that 
the  model  provides  a  unique  equilibrium  outcome,  and  this  assumption  is  generally  introduced 
through  the  linearisation  (in levels  or  logs)  of the  relevant  variables.  Even  within  the  confines  of  a 
supply-side  model  (and  so leaving  aside questions  of the  role  of aggregate  demand  and  of hysteresis), 
the presumption  of a unique  equilibrium  must  be  questioned.  Let  us  first  note  that  models  have  been 
presented  which  encompass  the  essential  notion  of a NAIRU  (in terms  of the  interaction  of wage  and 
price  setting  behavior)  and which  generate  multiple  equilibrium  (e.g.  Sawyer,  1982,  Manning,  1992). 
This arises in effect  from  the nature  of the price  equation  whereby  (inverse  of) the  real  product  wage 
is a non-monotonic  function  of capacity  utilization  (and  thereby  of unemployment.  This  can  simply 
be  a  reflect  of  a u-shaped  cost  curve  and  that  under  imperfect  competition  enterprises  may  be 
operating  on the  downward  portion  of that  curve  (and  not  as under  perfect  competition  barred  from 
doing  so by the  thrust  of the  first-order  optimization  conditions).  Further,  in models  such  as that  of 
LNJ  (1991)  outlined  above,  imperfect  competition  in the  product  market  is assumed,  and  the  single 
aggregate  price  equation  is  intended  to  summarize  the  many  enterprise  or  industry  level  price 
equations  (though  there  is rarely, if ever,  any discussion  of the  problems  of aggregation  which  would 
be  entailed,  bearing  in  mind  that  the  material  inputs  of  one  enterprise  are  the  outputs  of  other 
enterprises,  whereas  vertical  integration  is in effect  assumed  in the  aggregate  price  equation).  We  are 
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that  price  equations  estimated  at  lower  levels  of  aggregation  suggest  that  the  pattern  of  price 
formation  varies  between  industries:  cf.  Sawyer,  1983).  Instead  we  should  point  to  the  lack  of  any 
theoretical  (since this is a theoretical  matter)  arguments  as to  the  uniqueness  of any  equilibrium  based 
on  imperfect  competition.  Indeed  the  new  Keynesian  literature,  which  could  be  seen  to  have  some 
overlap  with  the  NAIRU,  places  some  emphasis  on possible  multiple  equilibria. 
LNJ  (1991)  argue  that  ‘of course,  in this  context,  a unique  equilibrium  is ensured  by the  linearity  of 
the model.  However,  there  is nothing  sacrosanct  about  linearity,  and  as soon  as we  recognize  that  the 
impact  of  unemployment  on  the  price  mark-up  on  wages  can  go  either  way,  the  prospect  of 
multiple  equilibria  opens  up.’  (p.  370).  ‘It should,  however,  be noted  that  multiple  equilibria  of this 
type  are rarely  looked  for,  and  never  found,  in any empirical  investigation.  For  an extensive  search, 
see  Carmth  and  Oswald  1988’. 
Equilibrium  in economics  is oflen  associated  (made  synonymous  with)  market  clearing,  and  as such 
each individual  is also  in equilibrium  in the  sense  that  (s)he  is buying  or  selling  what  (s)he  wishes  to 
buy  or  sell  at  the  prevailing  (equilibrium)  price.  For  the  NRU,  market  clearing  with  realized 
expectations  (on inflation)  is the nature  of the equilibrium.  But  the  NAIRU  relies  on  a rather  different 
equilibrium  concept.  It  is  based  on  a  macro  requirement  (that  is  one  which  has  no  individual 
counterpart  and cannot  be derived  by summation  from  the individual  level)  that  real  wages  rise  in line 
with  labour  productivity,  i.e. that  labor’s  share  in national  income  is constant.  In the  nature  of these 
models  any other  outcome  would  be unsustainable  since it would  involve  a continually  rising  or falling 
labor  share  (and  hence  one  which  would  eventually  exceed  the  feasible  limits  of zero  and  one). 
The  route  through  which  equilibrium  may  be  attained  has  not  received  much  attention,  and  it  is 
argued  here that  it is far from  clear  that,  within  the  context  of the  models  proposed,  there  would  be 
a movement  towards,  rather  than  away from,  the NAIRU.  Stability  appears  to  have  two  aspects.  The 
first  concerns  the  adjustment  of  demand  to  the  supply  side  determined  levels  of  output  and 
unemployment,  and  the  second  the  stability  of the  interaction  of wages  and  prices.  Here  the  second 
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demand.  In  an integrated  model  it would  not  be possible  to  make  this  separation  but  in the  context 
of  the  models  underlying  the  NAIRU  it  is  (since  some  form  of  classical  dichotomy  operates).  In 
effect,  two  separate  questions  are  being  asked:  first,  on  the  supply  side,  does  the  real  wage  move 
towards  the  rate  which  would  apply  in equilibrium,  and  second,  does  aggregate  demand  (which  is 
assumed  to  set the  level of unemployment  in the  short  run)  adjust  towards  a level  consistent  with  the 
NAIRU.  l7 
In  the  perfectly  competitive  model,  the  postulated  adjustment  process  towards  the  NRU  is clear  : 
prices  rise (fall) in the  face  of excess  demand  (supply).  There  are  some  well-known  difficulties  with 
this  concerning  the  question  of who  is the  price  adjuster  is a model  with  only  price  takers  (Arrow, 
1959).  In the  competitive  case,  it is then  assumed  that  the  aggregate  behavior  of the  (average)  real 
wage  can  be derived  from  a consideration  of individual  labor  markets,  and  specifically  that  the  real 
wage  (relative  to  productivity)  falls  (rises)  in the  face  of high  (low)  unemployment  (as  a proxy  for 
excess  supply  of  labor).  It  should  also  be  noted  that  for  consistency  (and  from  the  application  of 
Walras’ Law)  excess  supply  (demand)  in the  labor  market  is matched  by excess  demand  (supply)  in 
the  product  market  and  hence  that  prices  rise  (fall)  relative  to  wages  in the  product  market  when 
wages  fall (rise) relative  to prices in the labor market.‘*  But  that  requires  that  excess  supply  of labour 
(high unemployment)  is matched  by an excess  demand  for  output  (high  capacity  utilization),  whereas 
the  assumption  which  runs through  discussions  of inflation  and  unemployment  is the  reverse,  namely 
that  unemployment  and capacity  utilization  are negatively  related,  often  expressed  in terms  of Okun’s 
Law. 
The  situation  is  rather  different  when  the  imperfectly  competitive  case  is taken.  The  NAIRU  is 
intended  to represent  an equilibrium  position  from  the interaction  of wage  and  price  setting.  The  two 
equilibrium  lines  are  drawn  from  different  considerations,  and  although  they  are  placed  together  on 
the  same  diagram,  the  question  is whether  there  is any  ‘market  place’  where  they  interact  such  that 
the NAIRU  (and  the  corresponding  real  wage)  can be  determined.  The  usual  case  is the  interaction 
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for that product, and the adjustment of price  takes  place  in that  market  at a speed  which  depends  on 
the  extent  of excess  supply  or  demand.  But  that  is not  the  case  with  the  wage  and  price  behavior.  In 
this  regard  the p-  and w-curves  in Figure  1 are  on  a par  with  the  IS-LM  lines  : they  relate  to  the 
aggregate  level,  drawn  from  different  considerations  and  await  a specification  of the  disequilibrium 
behavior.  In  the  case  of  IS  LM,  though,  it is usually  assumed  that  Y rises  (falls)  when  Y is below 
(above)  the IS curve,  and  Y  falls (rises)  when  r is above  (below)  the  LM  curve.  For  the  NAJRU,  the 
real  wage  adjusts  on  both  the  price  side  and  the  wage  side,  and  the  adjustment  of  the  level  of 
economic  activity  is left  unspecified.  The  general  notion  is that  when  unemployment  is below  the 
NAIRU,  wages  rise faster than  (expected)  prices from  wage  determination  considerations”,  but  prices 
rise faster  than  (expected)  wages  from  price  determination  considerations,  giving  rise to  accelerating 
inflation.  The  overall  effect  on  realized  real wages  clearly  depends  on  the  relative  size  of the  wage 
inflation  and  price  inflation  (and  could  depend  on  the  responsiveness  of  wages  and  prices  to 
unemployment  and  capacity  utilization  respectively  and  on  the  accuracy  of  wage  and  price 
expectation  formation).  But  it is also the  case in the  LNJ  type  model  that,  when  unemployment  is say 
below  the  NAIRU,  the  real  wage  may  be  higher  or  lower  than  the  equilibrium  real  wage.  The 
additional  of  an error  correction  mechanism  for  both  wage  and  price  equations  could  diminish  the 
problem  raised  here though  it does  not  eliminate  it, in part  because  the  value  of the  wage:  price  ratios 
towards  which  adjustments  are made  are different  from  each  other  and  from  the  ‘equilibrium’  wage: 
price  ratio. 
In the model  of LNJ  (1991)  from  their  eqns.  44  and  45 in Chapter  8, the  NAIRU  can  be  solved  for 
(their  eqn.  47)  under  the  assumption  of  D2p  =  0,  Du  =  0  (hence  constant  inflation  and 
unemployment).  It  is  also  possible  to  solve  out  for  the  equilibrium  real  wage.  Now  suppose 
unemployment  is below  the NAIRU,  then  their eqn. 48 clearly indicates  that  price  inflation  would  rise. 
Whilst  expectations  and  misperceptions  will play  a role,  in the  price  adjustment  equation,  p  - w will 
be  higher  from  lower  unemployment  by  a factor  ,Oi  times  I/ and A1 times DU,  and from the wage 
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red  wage  may be rising or falling, and depending  on its initial level  moving  towards  or  away  from  the 
equilibrium  real wage.20 
6 The  role  of demand  and  Say’s  Law 
Although  the NAJRU  is derived  from  supply-side  considerations,  it still necessary  in our  view  to  ask 
the  question  as to  whether  there  is reason  to  think  that  the  aggregate  demand  will move  to  a level 
which  is consistent  with  the  NAIRU  : in other  words  are there  reasons  to  think  that  the  wages  and 
profits  which  would  be  generated  from  output  at the  NAIRU  would  lead  to  a level  of  expenditure 
which  would  willingly buy that  level of output.  The  issues  which  arise  here  are by no  means  new,  and 
indeed  were  a  key  element  in  the  development  of  the  neo-classical  synthesis  (following,  e.g. 
Modigliani,  1944,  Patinkin,  195 1, 1965).  It was  generally  considered  then  that  there  was  a sense  in 
which  the  real  balance  effect  did  permit  the  eventual  restoration  of full employment  through  higher 
levels of aggregate  demand,  but with the recognition  that  any such restoration  would  take  a long  time. 
The  argument  is well-known  namely that  a lower  price  level  raises  the  real  value  of  stock  of money, 
which  through  a wealth  effect  on consumer  demand,  stimulates  a higher  level  of demand.  There  were 
always  two  important  reservations  to  be  made  to  this  argument.  First,  it was  concerned  with  the 
effects  of  a lower  price  level,  but  did  not  consider  the  effects  of  a falling  price  level,  which  is,  of 
course,  a necessary  part  of the  achievement  of  a lower  price  level.  The  effects  of  falling  prices  on 
expectations,  confidence  and  the  stability  of the  financial  system  all suggested  that  the  achievement 
of a higher  level of demand  through  the real balance  effect was not without  danger.  Second,  the  effect 
of a lower  price  level comes  through  its effect  on  the  value  of  ‘outside’  money,  that  is money  which 
has been  created  outside  of the  private  economy  and  which  constitutes  net  worth  (for  which  there  is 
no counterpart  liability) for the private  sector  (Kalecki,  1944).  Since  credit  money  involves  matching 
assets  and  liabilities,  it  does  not  constitute  net  worth  for  the  private  sector,  and  in  industrialized 
economies  ‘outside’  money  is, at most,  to  be identified  with  government-issued  money. 
The  central  question  concerning  aggregate  demand  can be readily  exposed  by reference  to  the  LNJ 
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aspects,  there  are five basic  equations  (price  equation,  wage  equation,  link between  output/capacity 
and unemployment,  aggregate  demand  equation  and  competitiveness  equation),  from  the  equilibrium 
levels of the wage  price  ratio,  output,  unemployment  and competitiveness  and  demand  can  be  solved. 
The  aggregate  demand  equation  is: 
~d=u11~+u12~*+u,3(~-p)+u14Dpe+ulSc*  (8) 
where  x  includes  fiscal  stance,  world  economic  activity  and  world  relative  price  of  imports,  the 
foreign  real  rate  of  interest  is r*  = I*  - Dp*e  (nominal  rate  of  interest  minus  expected  foreign 
inflation),  m  - p  is  (log)  real  money  supply,  Dpe  expected  inflation  and  c*  expected  long  run 
competitiveness.  Clearly  ifyd  from  the  demand  side  is to  adjust  to  the  level  of output  as set  on  the 
supply  side, one  or more  of the  variables  on the  right  hand  side  have  to  adjust.  In the  formulation  of 
LNJ  (1991)  this would  seem to  be  some  combination  of the  fiscal  stance,  the  real  money  supply  and 
the expected  rate of inflation.  These  variables  present  a number  of rather  different  possibilities:  clearly 
the first would  involve  adjustment  by the government,  the  second  through  either  monetary  policy  (m) 
or the  price level and the third would  serve to  set the expected  (and hence  the  actual)  rate  of inflation. 
The  first  cannot  readily  be  seen  as an automatic  market  adjustment  mechanism,  even  if in practice 
deflationary  policies  are pursued  with  the  intent  of restraining  inflation. 
It  may  be  interesting  to  note  the  following  (in the  LNJ  approach):  suppose  that  the  fiscal  stance  is 
changed  such  that  there  would  be  a  1 per  cent  decrease  in  demand.  Then  prices  have  to  fall  to 
increase  the  real  balance  effect  by  a comparable  amount,  Further  suppose  that  the  size  of the  real 
balance  effect  on demand  is 0.05.  The  real balance  effect  only  arises  from  changing  prices  in respect 
of exogenous  money,  and this is taken  to be equivalent  to  MO (cash  and  reserves  with  Central  Bank). 
The ratio  of MO to income  is around  0.06 (for the  United  States),  and  hence  prices  would  have  to  be 
67  per  cent  lower  to  offset  the  1 per  cent  decrease  in demand  from  a change  in the  fiscal  stance.21 
With  an  approximate  coefficient  on  unemployment  in the  inflation  change  equation  of  1.4  in the 
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per cent in year 2 etc.. Prices  will be 67 per  cent  lower  than  otherwise  after  around  9 ‘/z  years  (which 
assumes  that  not  only  would  inflation  be lower  but  would  become  negative).  Assuming  that  during 
those  9 % years, the  stock  of money  grew  as it would  have done  otherwise,  then  after  nearly  a decade 
with  prices  falling  (assuming  that  the  initial  rate  of inflation  was  in single  figures),  the  real value  of 
the  outstanding  money  stock  would  have tripled.  This puts the  real balance  is its most  favorable  light, 
and takes  no account  of the  dynamic  effects  of such a deflation  nor the  effects  on  the  financial  system. 
Other  estimates  of the  effect  of unemployment  on the  rate  of inflation  are lower  than  those  of LNJ 
(cf.  figures  from  Gordon,  1997  cited  above),  and  the  use  of those  figures  would  serve  to  reinforce 
the  point  being  made  here. 
An  alternative  to  an appeal  to  the  real  balance  effect  is one  to  Say’s  Law  to  the  effect  that  supply 
creates  its own  demand,  and hence  there  would  then  be no problem  with  aggregate  demand  sustaining 
full employment.  This  could  apply  in the  case  of the  NRU.  But  the  NAIRU  is rather  different  in the 
sense that  it does  not  correspond  (in general)  to a position  of market  clearing  and  there  is involuntary 
unemployment.  At  the  prevailing  wages  (where  the  real  wage  is presumed  to  be  higher  than  that 
which  would  appertain  in a comparable  perfectly  competitive  case),  the  sum  of notional  (in Clower’s 
terminology)  demands  will  equal  the  sum  of notional  supplies.  For  individuals  unable  to  effect  their 
notional  supplies,  their  actual  supplies  will be below  the notional  ones,  and hence  their  actual  demands 
below  their notional  ones.  If Say’s Law  is taken  to be that potential  supply  would  create  an equivalent 
amount  of aggregate  demand,  and  that  potential  supply  corresponds  to  full employment,  then  when 
actual  supply  of labor is below  the potential,  we  can speculate  on how  supply  compares  with  demand. 
Iftheir  marginal  propensity  to  spend  is equal  to  unity,  Say’s  Law  continues  to  hold,  and  there  is no 
problem  : but  note  the  assumption  is required  that  the  marginal  propensity  to  consume  equals  unity. 
The  conclusion  which  can  be  drawn  from  this  discussion  is that  there  is no  convincing  mechanism 
given  by which  aggregate  demand  would  adjust  to  undermine  a level  of unemployment  equal  to  any 
supply-side  determined  NAIRU. 
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The  discussion  above  makes  clear  that  aggregate  demand  plays  no  role  in the  determination  of  a 
NAIRU  (indeed  that  has  been  part  of  our  definition  of  a NAIRU).  To  reinforce  the  point  on  the 
neglected  role  of  aggregate  demand  and  its  significance,  a simple  model  is presented  below  which 
reflects  some  features  viewed  as significant  in thinking  about  a NAIRU  but  generally  absent  from 
other  models.  The  purpose  of this  model  is not  to  claim  that  ours  is the  right  one,  and  others  wrong 
(for  all these  models  should  be regarded  as figments  of the  imagination),  but  rather  to  reflect  these 
influences  so that  others  can judge  their  relevance.  Variables  have  conventional  definitions  and  are 
in logs  (unless  otherwise  indicated),  D is the  difference  operator. 
The  wage  equation  repeats  eqn  (1)  above  : 
Dw=a,+a,Dp  e+aZU+a,(w-p-T)  (9) 
From  this bargaining  approach  under  the  equilibrium  condition  of Dv  = Dp” = Dp,  it can  be derived 
that: 
--a&w-p)=a,+(a,-l)Dp+a,U++a,T  (10) 
The  price  equation  is given  by: 
p-w=b,+b,CU+(a-l)(k-C)+logf  (11) 
where  this is derived  from  profit  maximization  with  a homothetic  production  function  of the  form  Y 
= f(L”K’+),  f >O, and  the  second  derivative  f’  can be positive  or negative  depending  on  the  returns 
to  scale,  CUrepresents  capacity  utilization,  k is log  of a measure  of the  capital  stock  and  I is log  of 
employment.  In  the  price  equation  logf  can  be  positive  or  negative.  The  mark-up  of  price  over 
marginal  cost  depends  on the  elasticity  of demand,  and variations  in the  elasticity  of demand  over  the 
business  cycle  are  reflected  in  term  involving  CU,  and  b,  can  be  positive  or  negative.  Capacity 
utilization  can  be thought  of  as measured  against  some  convention  of full capacity.  The  terms  k - 2 
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marginal  costs.  As  an  approximation  k - I is equal  to  k - n +  lJ (where  n is log  of Ml  employment) 
and  U is the  rate  of unemployment  (approximating  log  (1 - U) by 4).  The  link between  CU  and  U 
is written  as CU  = -cU -e(k - n)  (c,e  positive)  to  reflect  that  UJ  can  shift  relative  to  U, depending 
on  the  level  of investment. 
Combining  these  equations  (which  at this  stage  appear  to  omit  any reference  to  aggregate  demand) 
yields: 
=a,+(a,-l)Dp+a,U+a,T-a,b,-a,b,(-cU-ek+en)-a,(a-l)(k-n+U)-a,logf  (12) 
and  re  arranging  gives: 
[-a,-a,b,c+a,(a-l)]U=a,-a,b,+(a,-l)Dp+a,T-a,(eh,+(a-l)(n-k)-a,logf  (13) 
In this equation,  a, is negative,  hence  -a, positive,  a,b,c  can be of either  sign,  and  a,(a-1)  is expected 
to  be positive. 
The  effects  of  higher  inflation  is negative  if a,  -  1  is negative  (unless  a, =  1) and  so higher  inflation 
lowers  unemployment  at  cost  of  lower  real  wage.  The  effect  of  a higher  k depends  on  the  sign  of 
a,b,e  + (a  - 1) which  we  see  as likely  to  be negative  so that  a higher  k lowers  U.  The  effect  of n is 
the  opposite  of the  effect  of k (and hence  is thought  likely to  raise  the  rate  of unemployment).  Finally, 
a higher  value  off  is associated  with  higher  unemployment. 
Equation  (13) clearly suggests  that the level of unemployment  (which  could  be  described  as a supply- 
side equilibrium  level of unemployment  based  on the  mutual  consistency  of wage  and  price  behavior) 
depends  on the  rate of inflation,  the  target  real wage,  the  log  of the  capital  stock  (k), the  level  of f%ll 
employment  and f  ‘. A solution  for  the  equilibrium  real wage  can  also  be  derived  from  this  model. 
The  significance  of all of the  variables  included  (other  than  the  rate  of inflation  which  would  in any 
case drop  out  if  a, = 1) is that  they  are likely  to  be both  path  dependent  and  to  be  influenced  by the 
level  of  aggregate  demand  through  its  effects  on  investment  and  the  capital  stock.  There  is though 
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ratio  can  be raised  (and  hence  the  real wage). 
This  model  would  still involve  an  ‘equilibrium’  rate  of  unemployment  which  reconciles  wage  and 
profit  claims,  and  has  some  of the  attributes  of a NAIRU.  However,  it hopefully  serves  to  illustrate 
the  dependence  of that  ‘equilibrium’  rate of unemployment  on the path  of aggregate  demand.  Further, 
whether  this  ‘equilibrium’  rate  of  unemployment  involves  a  significant  degree  of  unemployment 
depends  on  the  degree  to  which  the  real  wage  aspirations  of  workers  can  be  fulfilled  by  a higher 
capital  stock  (which  would  serve to create  a higher  level of capacity  and a higher  capital  output  ratio). 
8. How  are  real wages  settled  ? 
The  point  was  made  above  that,  for  a particular  set  of environmental  conditions  including  the  level 
of  demand  facing  an  enterprise  and  the  prices  charged  by  its  competitors,  there  would  be  a point 
outcome  for  its decisions  on variables  such  as employment,  output,  price  (and  thereby  real  product 
wage).  Hence  in  order  to  map  out  a real  product  wage  -  employment  relationship,  it  would  be 
necessary  to  shifl one  of the environmental  variables,  and in particular  variations  in aggregate  demand 
would  lead to variations  in real  product  wage  and  employment  decided  upon  by the  enterprise.  This 
means  that  any  point  on  the  p-curve  in Figure  1 has  to  be  supported  by  an  appropriate  level  of 
aggregate  demand,  but further  for any equilibrium  position,  the  level  of aggregate  demand  generated 
by the  resulting  wages  and  profits  would  have  to  be  equal  to  the  initial  level  of demand. 
The  ‘story’ underlying  a model  such as that  depicted  in Figure  1 is one  in which  prices  and  wages  are 
set independently  (even  though,  of course,  enterprises  are involved  in both  sets  of decisions)  and  the 
potentially  conflicting  implications  for  the  real  wage  are  ‘resolved’  through  the  level  of  economic 
activity  (which  was  measured  by the  level  of  employment  in Figure  1). However,  there  are  many 
models  of  wage  and  price  determination  in which  there  is a sense  in which  prices  and  wages  are 
simultaneously  set. The  simplest  way of illustrating  that  point  would  be the  case  of highly  centralized 
bargaining  (at the  limit one  organization  representing  all employers  and  one  representing  all workers). 
In  general,  the  real  wage  which  would  then  result  would  depend  on  many  factors  such  as  the 
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unemployment.  At the  agreed  real wage,  the  level  of employment  would  be determined  by the  level 
of  aggregate  demand.  Whilst  this  example  allows  a clear  statement  of the  issue,  it is now  useful  to 
consider  two classes  of model  which  have been  widely  used  but  in the  context  of decentralized  wage 
determination  (for  elaboration  of  these  models  in  this  context  see  Sawyer,  1997a).  These  are 
efficiency  wage  models  and bargaining  models.  In both  cases, there  is a point  outcome  in terms  of real 
product  wage  and  the  level  of employment  (as well  as for  other  variables)  arising  from  a particular 
economic  environment.  This environment  though  includes  two  variables  of particular  interest,  namely 
the  level  of  aggregate  demand  and  the  level  of unemployment  benefits.  With  regard  to  the  former, 
variations  in the  level  of aggregate  demand  would  map  out  a relationship  which  was  similar  to  that 
given  as the  p-curve  in Figure  1. With  regard  to  the  latter,  in both  cases,  (real  product)  wage  is set 
at  the  enterprise  level  relative  to  some  alternative  wage,  which  is a weighted  average  of wages  in 
other  enterprises  and  of the  level  of unemployment  benefits.  Under  the  equilibrium  condition,  that 
wages  in  enterprises  are  equal,  there  is  a relationship  between  the  wage  relative  to  the  level  of 
unemployment  benefits  and  the  level  of employment  (illustrated  in Figure  2).  In the  context  of these 
models,  the key question  concerns  the  determination  of the  level  of unemployment  benefits.  Simply, 
if’the State  fixes unemployment  benefits  as a proportion  of wages,  then  by doing  so it in effect  fixes 
the level of employment.22 When  unemployment  benefits  are  set relative  to  the  price  level,  then  there 
is again only one  level  of employment  which  provides  the  same  real product  wage  from  the  p-curve 
and  from  the  wage-benefit  curve  given  in Figure  2. However,  as previously  discussed,  there  would 
be  no  reason  to  think  that  the  level  of  aggregate  demand  would  adjust  to  support  that  level  of 
employment. 
Figure  2 near  here 
However,  when  the  nominal  level  of  unemployment  benefits  is taken  as  a given,  and  from  which 
calculations  on wages  and prices  are based,  then  the  level  of employment  is not  constrained  by these 
decisions.  In  effect,  it is envisaged  that  there  is a point  on  the  p-curve  which  is aggregate  demand 
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is generated  by it. 
9.  NAIRU  tracking  actual  unemployment 
It has been observed  (e.g. Worswick,  1985)  that  there  is a tendency  for  the  estimates  of the  NAIRU 
to move in line with  observed  unemployment.”  One response  to  this  would  be that  movements  in the 
NAIRU  are driving  movements  in the  actual  level  of unemployment,  that  is the  NAIRU  is acting  as 
a strong  attractor.  This argument  runs  into  two  particular  difficulties,  First,  although  I am  not  aware 
of any formal  tests  on this, it would  seem that  at most  the  change  in NAIRU  and  the  change  in actual 
unemployment  are contemporaneous  rather  than the NAIRU  leading  actual.  Second,  the  point  would 
be  more  convincing  if there  was  supporting  evidence  that  movements  in the  factors  which  are  said 
to  determine  the  NAIRU  were  consistent  with  the  movements  in  the  NAIRU.  We  have  argued 
elsewhere  (Sawyer,  1998) that  the  (rather  limited)  evidence  on  movements  in variables  such  as level 
of unionization,  unemployment  benefits  over the past 20 or so years  should  have  reduced  the  NAIRU 
whilst  most  estimates  of the  NAIRU  have  risen.  These  two  difficulties  do  illustrate  that  the  NAIRU 
is obtained  from  estimated  price  and  wage  equations,  and  those  estimates  can  only  be expost. 
There  are  a  number  of  reasons  for  thinking  that  estimates  of  the  NAIRU  will  trail  the  actual 
experience  of unemployment.  The  first  arises  from  the  observation  that  the  NAIRU  is also  the  rate 
of unemployment  which  maintains  a constant  labor share. It is generally  observed  that  whilst  the  share 
of  labor  does  vary  over  time  (and  has  tended  to  decline  in recent  years)  it does  not  move  greatly. 
Thus  an estimate  of the  rate  which  maintains  a constant  labor  share  is likely  to  fall within  the  range 
of experienced  unemployment,  and as the experienced  rate of unemployment  changes  (and  specifically 
if  as in most  European  countries  over  the  past  two  decades)  shifts  up  so will the  estimated  NAIRU. 
The  second  reason  has  often  been  placed  under  the  label  of  hysteresis,  whereby  the  path  of 
unemployment  influences  the  position  of any  equilibrium  end-point.  One  mechanism  which  has  been 
much  discussed  is that the  experience  of unemployment  has  persistent  effects.  For  example,  there  are 
‘three main elements  to  the  idea  that  the  duration  of unemployment  can  effect  a worker’s  chance  of 
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1. effects  on job  search; 
2  effects  on  the  worker’s  skill, motivation,  and  morale; 
3. job screening  and  employer  perceptions.’  (LNJ,  1991,  p.258) 
Insofar  as  these  factors  lead  to  a  combination  of  reduced  effective  supply  of  labor  or  a  greater 
mismatch  between  supply  and  demand,  they  may  lead  to  rising  unemployment.  It is in keeping  with 
the  NAIRU  approach  that  this  is an essentially  supply-side  explanation. 
Another  mechanism  is the  adjustment  of the  capital  stock,  which  has been  discussed  above  (see  also 
Sawyer,  1997b).  In terms  of Figure  1 the  p-curve  will tend  to  shift  inwards  as capacity  falls. 
These  considerations  lead  to  a more  significant  one,  namely  how  useful  are  the  estimates  of  the 
NAIRU.  Price  and wage  inflation  and unemployment  (and other  variables  which  may  be  of relevance) 
fluctuate  over  the business  cycle (and generally  do  not  display  any pronounced  trend).  Now  suppose 
that the  mechanism  generating  price inflation was quite  separate  from  the  mechanism  which  generates 
unemployment.  A regression  of price  inflation  on unemployment  may  or may  not  be  successful  (and 
it is known  that there  are many ways  in which  price  inflation  and  unemployment  can  be measured  so 
that  cynically  we  may  remark  that  only  the  successful  regressions  are  publishable).  Suppose  it  is 
successful  (in the  sense  that  it passes  relevant  statistical  criteria,  that  the  coefficient  on  lagged  price 
inflation  is not  significantly  different  from  unity  and that on unemployment  is negative  and  statistically 
significant),  and  an  equilibrium  solution  for  unemployment  is  derived  and  given  the  name  of  the 
NAIRU.  What  does  it  tell  us  ?  The  most  it  can  tell  us  is  that  if  over  the  estimation  period 
unemployment  had been  at a particular  level  (the  calculated  NAIRU)  then  inflation  would  have  been 
stable.24 But  it cannot  tell us what  are the  determinants  of the  NAIRU,  and  in particular  cannot  tell 
us what  would  have happened  if the level of aggregate  demand  had been higher  (and  we  would  expect 
that  as a consequence  investment  and  then  the  capital  stock  higher). 
10. Conclusions 
Two  issues  arise  in respect  of the  NAIRU  approach  which  should  be  kept  distinct.  The  first  is the 
27  August  1, 1997 question  of  whether  inflation  (notably  wage  inflation)  is  negatively  related  to  the  level  of 
unemployment  (though  other  variables  may  be  involved  as well).  Much  empirical  effort  has  been 
devoted to investigating  the  answer  to  that  question  (and  I have  participated  myself,  Hemy,  Sawyer 
and  Smith,  1976). The  second  is the  question  of whether  there  is a level  of unemployment  for  which 
inflation  would  be  constant  and  if so what  are the  determinants  of that  level  of unemployment.  In 
particular,  is any  such  level  of  unemployment  to  be  regarded  as  capable  of  being  shifted  through 
changes  in the  capital  stock,  measures  to  arrive  at a consensus  over  the  distribution  of income  etc.. 
There  is some  link  between  these  questions  in that  if the  answer  to  the  first  question  is no,  then  it is 
not  possible  to  calculate  a NAIRU.25  The  focus  of this  paper  has been  more  on  the  second  question 
than  the  first,  which  we  would  see  as  the  much  more  important.  For  example,  if  the  NAIRU 
corresponded  to the NRU  (in the  sense of being  a level  of unemployment  which  was  accepted  as full 
employment),  then  we.  would  observe  the  apparent  trade-off  between  wage  inflation  and 
unemployment,  but be quite  relaxed  about  it for we  would  not  wish  to  push  employment  past  the  full 
employment  level. The relevant  question  would  then  be how  strong  an attractor  is the  NRU  and  what 
is the  role  of aggregate  demand  in reaching  that  point. 
It is argued  here that  aggregate  demand  has be the  disregarded  guest  at the  NAIRU  party.  Aggregate 
demand  has  to  be considered  in deriving  relationships  between  the  real  wage  and  employment,  and 
in  underpinning  any  level  of  employment  (equilibrium  or  not)  which  could  be  achieved.  Further, 
aggregate  demand  enters  into the determination  of the level of unemployment  in two  further  respects, 
namely  through  its effect  on capacity  and in a range  of cases where  the  relationship  between  price  and 
wage  is settled  at the  enterprise  level. 
Stiglitz  (1997)  elaborates  three  criteria  for  evaluating  the  NAIRU:  ‘does  the  derivation  of 
unemployment  from  some  natural  rate  provide  a robust  and  useful  way  to  predict  changes  in the 
inflation  rate  ? . .  . The  second  criterion  [is] can  economists  explain  why  the  NAIRU  changes  over 
time?.  . .  [T]he  third  criterion  asks  whether  the  NAIRU  is a usefbl way to frame policy  discussions 
despite  all the uncertainty  surrounding  its precise  level  and  direction  of change’.  (p.4)  This  paper  has 
28  August  1, 1997 only briefly touched  on the  first  two  criterion,  and  has  considered  matters  which  are  relevant  to  the 
third  criterion.  With  regard  to that  criterion,  the  basic  arguments  pursued  in this  paper  are that  there 
are  a series  of theoretical  weaknesses  with  the  approach  to  the  NAIRU,  and  in particular  there  has 
been  a rather  cavalier  dismissal  of the  role  of  aggregate  demand.  Specifically,  if the  notion  that  for 
some  given  set of institutional  and other  arrangements,  there  is a level  of unemployment  which  would 
be  consistent  with  constant  unemployment,  then  it is necessary  to  explore  the  determinants  of that 
level  of  unemployment,  and  the  degree  to  which  it  can  be  shifted  over  time  with  appropriate 
aggregate  demand,  income  distributional  and  supply-side  policies. 
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Endnotes 
1. I am grateful  to  Philip  Arestis  for  comments  on  an earlier  draft. 
2. The  distinction  is maintained  between  the  ‘natural  rate  of unemployment’  (NRU)  as defined  by 
Friedman  (1968)  (see  quote  later  in the  text)  as the  level  of unemployment  which  would 
correspond  to  a market  clearing  competitive  labor  market  and  the  NAIRU  as the  level  of 
unemployment  at which  inflation  would  be constant  which  would  include  the  NRU  as a special 
case  where  markets  are  competitive. 
3. It  can  be noted  here  (as others  have  done)  that  the  NAIRU  is a misnomer  in that  it is the  price 
level  which  is not  accelerating  rather  than  the  rate  of inflation  (cf.  Cross,  1995) 
4. Any  particular  NAIRU  is the  solution  to  a particular  model  with  the  imposition  of  certain 
equilibrium  conditions  (e.g.  that  expectations  are fblfilled).  In the  text  the  term  equilibrium  is used 
32  August  1, 1997 in that  limited  sense  as the  property  of  a particular  solution  of a model,  and  it is not  intended  that 
the  term  carries  any broader  connotation  such  as market  clearing. 
5. For  a model  which  leads  to  this  type  of conclusion  see  Sawyer  (1997b). 
6. The  figures  which  LNJ  (1991)  estimate  for  the  United  States  are  /3, 3.10  y1 0.32  pZ  2.10  yZ 
0.37.  From  their  eqn.  (48)  it can  then  be calculated  that  the  implied  coefficient  on  (u-u*)  (actual 
unemployment  minus  the  NAIRU)  in the  equation  for  the  acceleration  of inflation  is then 
3.42/2.47  which  is approximately  1.4. 
7. In the  case  of utility,  it could  be argued  that  since  it is used  in the  context  of an individual 
maximizing  utility,  each  individual  (and  hence  the  users  of the  concept  of utility)  would  know  by 
introspection  whether  utility  existed.  Similar  consideration  would  apply  to  rational  expectations. 
8. The  four  alternative  interpretations  are (I.)  labor  market  adjustment  with  expected  real  wage 
changes  a function  of the  excess  demand  for  labor,  and  unemployment  is a negative  proxy  for  that 
excess  demand,  (ii) a trade-off  between  inflation  and  the  level  of economic  activity,  (iii) expected 
real  wage  changes  are  a function  of unemployment,  which  operates  as the  ‘industrial  reserve 
army’  of the  unemployed,  (iv) the  ‘surprise  function  with  movements  in unemployment  as a 
function  of inflation  surprises. 
9. In the  Federal  Reserve  macroeconomic  model,  there  are two  equilibrium  relationships  between 
the  (log  of the)  real wage  and  the  unemployment  rate,  one  arising  from  the  equilibrium  money 
wage  equation  and  the  other  from  the  equilibrium  price  equation.  Dynamic  adjustment  equations 
for  wage  and  price  changes  in terms  of deviations  of the  actual  wage  (price)  from  the  equilibrium 
level  are  estimated  (Table  6, p.22)  . The  text  calculated  the  NAIRU  as ‘a bit less than  6 per  cent, 
currently,  in terms  of the  civilian  unemployment  rate’.  Source:  A Guide  to  the  FRB/U  by 
Macroeconomic  and  Quantitative  Studies,  Federal  Reserve  Board,  October  1996. 
10. There  are,  in our  view,  some  very  considerable  differences  in approach  as between  what  is 
said in Chapters  1, 7 and  8 of LNJ  (1991)  and  in Chapter  2. In the  former,  they  present  a variety 
of models  in which  wages  and  prices  are  settled  at the  firm  level  and  the  relationship  between 
wages  and  unemployment  benefits  is a crucial  one.  In the  latter  ‘we do  not  propose  to  be too 
specific’  (p.364),  and  aggregate  price  and  wage  equations  interact  to  set the  NAIRU,  and  there  is 
no  explicit  mention  of unemployment  benefits. 
11. For  example,  ‘Equation  (7) then  becomes  the  marginal  productivity  condition  and  is a 
standard  labor  demand  function  .  ..I (LNJ,  1991,  p.341). 
12. They  do,  however,  note  that  ‘wages  may  be  determined  by a variety  of methods  and  in this 
chapter  we  do  not  propose  to  be too  specific.  We  see wages  as being  influenced  by firm-specific 
or  ‘insider’  factors,  such  as productivity  and  the  well-being  of the  workforce,  and  by  ‘outsider’ 
factors,  such  as wages  paid  elsewhere  and  the  general  state  of the  labour  market.’  (LNJ,  1991, 
p.364) 
33  August  1, 1997 13. This  problem  is more  severe  in the  case  of Layard  and Nickel1 (1985)  where  the  price 
equation  and  the  wage  equation  are  essentially  the  same. 
14. See  the  related  paper  Sawyer  (1997b)  for  further  discussion  on the  role  of capital  formation 
on the  NAIRU. 
15. There  are  also  issues  of the  stability  of an equilibrium  and  movement  to  equilibrium:  cf., 
(Sawyer,  1992). 
16. For  example,  we  estimated  the  relationship  between  unemployment  and  capacity  utilization  for 
the  USA  and  found  the  following: 
A regression  of unemployment  on  a measure  of capacity  utilization  (deviations  of output  from 
trend)  over  the  period  1967  qtr  4 to  1996  qtr 4 yields 
Dependent  variable  Unemployment  U 
rho  = 0.396  (s.e.  0.124)  R-squared  = .9875,  Adjusted  R-squared  = .9869,  Durbin-Watson 
statistic  = 2.0697 
Dl  = dummy  value  1 from  1967(4)  to  1980(4),  0 otherwise  ; D2  = dummy  value  1 from  1981( 1) 
to  1996(4),  0 otherwise  ; CU  measure  of capacity  utilisation,  T time 
These  suggest  that  over  some  lengthy  periods  there  is a time  trend  in the  relationship  and  further 
that  the  nature  of that  time  trend  shifts  from  period  to  period. 
Gordon  (1997)  tn.4  reports  that  the  relationship  between  unemployment  and  ratio  of actual  to 
‘natural  real’  GDP  differed  in the  first  half of the  1990s  from  most  of the  postwar  period. 
17. In models  such  as those  of LNJ  (199 I),  aggregate  demand  does  not  depend  on the  distribution 
of income  or the  real  wage.  This  permits  some  degree  of separation  between  the  two  aspects  of 
stability  considered  in the  text  which  would  not  be present  when  aggregate  demand  is dependent 
on  the  distribution  of income  (and  hence  on the  differential  movement  of prices  and  wages) 
18. The  brief  description  in the  text  refers  to  the  neo-classical  view  of the  competitive  labor 
market.  A perspective  based  on  Keynes  (1936)  especially  chapter  2 would  be rather  different.  Our 
point  here  is not  that  the  neo-classical  analysis  of the  labor  market  is right  or wrong,  but  rather 
that  it does  have  a clear  adjustment  process. 
19. We  seek  to  avoid  the  use  of the  term  ‘labor  market’  here  since  the  wage  setting  processes 
have  little  in common  with  a market  in which  there  are  demand  and  supply  schedules  based  on 
parametric  prices. 
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